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BEYOND THE MONTREAL CONVENTION*

John P. Grantt
L Introduction
The Lockerbie trial holds a dazzling number of "firsts." ' Besides
being the longest and most expensive criminal trial in Scottish legal history,
it was the first time a Scottish criminal court had sat outside Scotland and
the first time the jury in the trial of serious crime had been replaced with
three experienced judges as fact finders. The destruction of Pan Am 103
over Lockerbie on 21 December 1988, resulting in 270 deaths, was one of
the largest terrorist atrocities of its day and some might say the start of the
"new" terrorism, where all restraints on the scale of destruction and death
are abandoned. For the first time, the Security Council imposed sanctions
on a State to induce it to surrender two of its nationals for trial abroad. The
case brought by Libya against the United States and United Kingdom to
have the strict letter of the Montreal Convention applied was the first direct
invocation of the claim that the International Court of Justice has the power
of judicial review and the first direct challenge to the Security Council's
powers to take decisions on any matter.
The lessons to be drawn from the Lockerbie trial cannot be seen in
isolation and must be viewed through the lens of the 9/11 atrocities. If the
destruction of Pan Am 103 marks the beginning of the "new" terrorism,
then 9/11 marks its (current) zenith. Viewed together, these atrocities raise
questions about the adequacy of the terrorism conventions in suppressing
terrorist acts and the role of the UN Security Council, and even States
individually or collectively, in taking more forceful, even forcible,
measures against terrorists and those States that sponsor, shield or succor
them.

* Presented at the War Crimes Research Symposium: "Terrorism on Trial" at Case
Western Reserve University School of Law, sponsored by the Frederick K. Cox International
Law Center, on Friday, Oct. 8, 2004.
1 Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark School of Law, Portland, OR and Emeritus Professor
of International Law, University of Glasgow, Scotland.
JOHN P. GRANr, THE LOCKERBiE TRIAL BRIEFING HANDBOOK 1-4 (2nd ed. 2000).
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II. The Montreal Convention
The Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation of 19712 is the third convention in an
international terrorism regime that has evolved piecemeal, usually as a
response to particular terrorist activities.3 So, the first concern was with
offences against civil aviation, originally in the form of hijacking 4 and then
in the form of sabotage of aircraft5 and airports.6 This rdgime was later
extended to ships 7 and offshore installations. 8 When the international
community became apprehensive about attacks on diplomatic and
international personnel, two further international conventions were adopted,
dealing with internationally protected persons, essentially diplomats, and
with the taking of hostages. 0 The transportation of nuclear material has
been the subject of a separate agreement, as has the "marking" of plastic
explosives for the purpose of detection. 12 More recently, the international

Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Montreal
Convention].
3 For example, the Montreal Convention was adopted as a response to the bombings
of
three aircraft in September 1970, two hijacked to Dawson's Field inJordan and exploded on
the ground, a third bombed on the ground at Cairo.
2

4 Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; See also Hague Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S.
105.
5 Montreal Convention, supra note 2.
6 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474, 27 I.L.M. 627
(supplementary to Montreal Convention, supra note 2).
7 Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221, 27 I.L.M. 672.
8 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms
Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304, 27 I.L.M. 685.
9 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167, 13
I.L.M. 41.
10International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No.
11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
1iConvention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, T.I.A.S. No.
11,080, 18 I.L.M. 1419.
12 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1,
1991, 30 I.L.M. 721.
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focus has broadened into terrorist bombings 13 and the fundamental issue of
the financing of terrorism.' 4 This makes a staggering total of twelve global
conventions," all of which have secured a respectable number of
ratifications. 16 There are, for example, 176 parties to the Montreal
7
Convention, including Libya, the United States and the United Kingdom.'
As yet, there is no comprehensive or omnibus terrorism convention. It
is often said that the term "terrorism" defies definition and, as a
consequence, it would be impossible or impracticable to elaborate a
convention against terrorism in the round.' 8 Certainly, largely because of
the subjective and politicized nature of terrorism, one person's terrorist
being another person's freedom fighter, a generally agreed definition of
terrorism in international law "remains elusive."' 9 There is merit in the
argument that attempting to define terrorism serves no real purpose 20 and
the adoption of piecemeal conventions to cope with particular terrorist acts
has avoided the need for a definition of terrorism. The international
community, not needing to define international terrorism as a phenomenon,
has nonetheless been able to address terrorists' acts as and when they reach
a level, qualitatively or quantitatively, that is unacceptable.
The Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, its legal
committee, is presently in the process of drafting what it is pleased to call a
13 International

Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Jan. 12, 1998,

G.A. Res. 52/164, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., 72d mtg., U.N. Doc. AIRES/52/164 (1997),
reprintedin 37 I.L.M. 249 (1998).
14International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Jan. 10,
2000, G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. GAOR 54th Sess., 76th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109
(2000), reprintedin 39 I.L.M. 268 (2000).
15 See International Instruments Related to the Prevention and Suppression of
International Terrorism, U.N. Sales No. E.01.V.3 (2001) (providing the official texts of the
foregoing treaties).
16 See United Nations Treaty Collection Conventions on Terrorism, at
http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp (providing the current status of the foregoing
treaties).
17Libya acceded to the Montreal Convention on February 19, 1974, and the United States
and United Kingdom ratified the Convention on November 1, 1972 and October 25, 1973
respectively. Id.
18ROSALYN HIGGINS & MAURICE FLORY, TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 27-28

(1997).
19 Christopher C. Joyner & Wayne P. Rothbaum, Libya and the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie: What Lessons for InternationalExtraditionLaw?, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 222, 228
(1993).
20 Geoffrey Levin, Is "Terrorism " Worth Defining?, 13 Ohio N.U. L..Rev. 97 (1986). See
also John F. Murphy, Defining International Terrorism: A Way Out of the Quagmire, 19
ISRAEL Y.B. HuM. RTS. 13 (1989); Jean-Marc Sorel, Some Questions About the Definition of
Terrorism and the FightAgainst Its Financing,14 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 365 (2003).
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"comprehensive" convention on international terrorism, 2 1 as well as a
convention on the suppression of nuclear terrorism. 22
The draft
comprehensive convention is only comprehensive in that it creates generic
terrorist offences involving death, serious injury and serious property
damage against a State or public facilities "when the purpose of the
conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel
a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing
any act.,,23 Apart from that, and the fact that the draft comprehensive
convention follows the earlier global agreements in its provisions on
prosecution, extradition and cooperation, it does not in any way replace the
existing conventional regime. Nor is it intended to. It is expressly provided
that any conflict between the comprehensive convention and the existing
agreements is to be resolved in favor of the existing agreements. 4 Thus,
the existing rdgime is to stay in place and, as it were, be supplemented by
the new convention, but only for those States that ratify it.
What is significant about the existing conventional regime for present
purposes is the fact that the agreements share a number of common, key
elements. These common elements fall into five broad areas. The first
common area is the identification of the particular terrorist offence or
offences covered by the agreement. So, the Montreal Convention specifies
as criminal, if done unlawfully and intentionally, a number of acts that
sabotage or are likely to sabotage a civilian aircraft.25 Thus, the destruction
of Pan Am 103 falls under art. l(1)(c), making it an offence to "place or
cause to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a
device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause
damage to it which renders it incapable of flight, or to cause damage to it
which is likely to endanger its safety in flight

. .

." Invariably, as in the

Montreal Convention, criminal liability for such acts extends beyond the
actual perpetrators to those who attempt these offences or who are
accomplices. 6
Secondly, the agreements require each State party to ensure that the
offences covered by the agreements are offences under its domestic law and
punishable by appropriate penalties recognizing the gravity of the offences.
The Montreal Convention, for example, obliges each State party "to make
21

Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, U.N.GAOR 6th Comm.,

U.N. Doc. A/57/35, Annexes I-IV. The Ad Hoc Committee established to elaborate the
convention has its own website where progress and textual revisions can be monitored at
www.un.or/law/terrorism/index.html.
22 Draft International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, U.N.
GAOR 6th Comm., U.N. Doc. A/57/37, Annex I.
23 Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, supra note 21, art. 2(1).
24 Id. art. 2.bis.
25 Montreal
26

Id. art. 1.

Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(1).
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the offences mentioned in Article 1 punishable by severe penalties., 27 The
third common area relates to jurisdiction. At a basic level, as in the
Montreal Convention, each State party is required to establish its
jurisdiction over offences committed in its territory or against or on board
an aircraft registered in that State or where the aircraft lands in its
territory.28 Later conventions in the regime adopt more detailed and
extensive, and in some cases bifurcated, rules on jurisdiction. The Terrorist
Bombings Convention of 1997, for example, requires each State party to
establish jurisdiction over offences committed in its territory, on board its
ships and aircraft and by its nationals 29; and then additionally permits - and
encourages - each State to establish jurisdiction in five other situations,
including situations in which the offences are committed against a national
of the State or a State facility abroad or are committed to compel the State
to do or abstain from doing some act.3°
The critical common area in the terrorism r6gime is the core obligation
to extradite or prosecute, often referred to as the aut dedere aut judicare
principle. It amounts to the duty to investigate and then to either report the
offender for prosecution or extradite the offender to a State that will
prosecute. Thus, the Montreal Convention demands that a State in whose
territory an alleged offender is present conduct a preliminary enquiry31 and,
if the circumstances so warrant, take the offender into custody. 32 Then, the
State must apply the aut dedere autjudicareprinciple: in terms of art. 7 of
the Montreal Convention, "if it does not extradite him, [the custodial State
is] obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence
was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution."

27 Id. art. 3.

The later conventions employ a slightly different formulation, e.g.

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra note 13, art. 4(b),
which requires a State to make the offences punishable by "appropriate penalties which take
into account the grave nature of those offences." The United Kingdom gave effect to its
obligations under the Montreal Convention in the Aviation Security Act, 1982, c. 36, pt. 1,
§ 1(13) (Eng.), with a maximum penalty of life imprisonment; the United States gave effect
to its obligations in the Aircraft Sabotage Act 1982, 18 U.S.C. §§ 31-32 (1982), with a
maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment.
28 Montreal Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(1).
29International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra note 13, art.
6(1).
30

Id. art. 6(2).

31Montreal Convention, supra note 2, art. 6(2)..
32Id. art. 6(1). Where the detained offender is a foreign national the national State must

be informed. Id. art. 6(4).
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It should be noted that nothing requires a State to extradite an alleged
offender.33
If a State cannot extradite an offender, either because
extradition is forbidden by its constitution or laws or because it does not
wish to do so, it can satisfy the requirements of art. 7 by reporting the case
to its prosecution authorities. Also, the obligation is to submit the case to
its prosecution authorities, not to actually prosecute the case in court. 34 It
is expected that the prosecution authorities will process terrorist crimes as
they would any other serious crimes. 35 Art. 7 must be read with art. 11,
requiring other States to provide "the greatest measure of assistance in
connection with criminal proceedings...,,36 Perhaps naively, it is assumed
in the Montreal Convention and the other terrorism conventions that a
custodial State exercising its right to prosecute an alleged offender will
refer the case to its prosecution authorities in good faith, that its prosecution
authorities will in turn investigate and, if there is sufficient evidence,
prosecute in good faith and that other States will honor their obligations of
assistance in the conduct of the investigation and any prosecution in good
faith. While nowhere explicitly set down in any of the terrorism
conventions, the principle of good faith underpins all treaties.37 Despite all
that, there is little doubt that aut dedere autjudicare,the cornerstone of the
international conventional regime, "may ensure little more than a facade of
justice.
Supplementary to the principle of aut dedere autjudicareare common
rules in the terrorism conventions concerning extradition. Typically, these
rules stipulate that the terrorist offences are deemed to be included within
existing extradition treaties and to be explicitly included in future treaties;
that the individual terrorism convention may be regarded as an extradition
treaty in the absence of an actual bilateral treaty; and that the terrorist
offences are not to be regarded as falling within the "political offence"

33 Sami Shubber, The Destruction of Aircraft in Flight over Scotland and Niger: The
Questions of Jurisdictionand Extradition UnderInternationalLaw, 1995 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L.
L. 239, 281-82.
34 See generally Alona E. Evans, The Apprehension and Prosecution of Offenders:
Some
Current Problems, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 493-503 (Alona E.
Evans & John F. Murphy eds., 1978) (discussing the concept of "submit to prosecution").
35 Montreal Convention, supra note 2, art. 7.
36 Later conventions are more explicit as to this obligation. See International Convention
for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra note 13, art. 10 (adding that this
cooperation is to include "assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for
the proceedings"); Id. art. 13 (stating that even the transfer of detained or convicted people
abroad to assist in the investigation and prosecution).
37 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22 1969, art. 26, 144 U.N.T.S. 331; 8
I.L.M. 679.
38Joyner & Rothbaum, supra note 19, at 248.
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exception common to extradition treaties. The Montreal Convention
provides explicitly only for the first two of these rules.39
40
The fifth common area among the global terrorism conventions
concerns other measures of cooperation required of the States parties.
These vary as between the various agreements and are both general and
subject specific. The most common general cooperative obligation is to
take all practicable measures to prevent the terrorist offences. 4
Specifically, the Montreal Convention requires the continuation for the
passengers and crew of any journey affected by an act of sabotage and
speedy return of any aircraft and cargo.
The international terrorism rdgime in general, and the Montreal
Convention in particular, are predicated on domestic prosecution of terrorist
crimes, either in the country in which the alleged offenders are found or in
another country to which these alleged offenders have been extradited. The
Lockerbie trial was a domestic prosecution, albeit with some adaptations of
normal procedure necessitated by the location of the trial outside Scotland.
While there is no doubt that Scotland had jurisdiction,43 under both
international and domestic law, over those accused of destroying Pan Am
103, as the bodies of all 270 victims were found in Scotland, as was the
debris of the aircraft. However, the government of the United Kingdom,
instead of letting the prosecution proceed on the basis of the normal rules of
criminal jurisdiction, proceeded under the authority of the Security Council.
The Order in Council which governed the Lockerbie trial was expressly
39 Montreal Convention, supra note 2, art. 8.
40

There are, however, other common areas beyond those enumerated in the text, but they

are of little importance to the present discussion, e.g. Montreal Convention, supra note 2, art.
7 (discussing fair trials); id. art. 14(1) (discussing settlement of disputes); id. arts. 15-16
(discussing the final provisions on signature, ratification, accession, entry into force,
denunciation and registration).
41 See Montreal Convention, supra note 2, art. 10(1); see International Convention for
the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra note 13, art. 15(b-c) (discussing the necessity of
exchanging intelligence and research findings).
42 Montreal Convention, supra note 2, art. 10(2).
43 Within the United Kingdom there are three civil and criminal jurisdictions: England
(which extends to Wales), Northern Ireland and Scotland. The independence of Scots
private law, though not Scots public law, and the Scottish court system survived the union of
Scotland with England in 1707 through the express terms of Articles XVIII and XIX of the
Treaty of Union. Scots law and the Scottish judicial system survive to this day separate
from the law and courts of its larger southern neighbor. Thus, the trial of the two Libyans
indicted in the destruction of Pan Am 103 was conducted using Scots criminal law (and
therefore Scottish legal definitions of murder and conspiracy to murder) in the (Scottish)
High Court of Justiciary, before judges known as Lords Commissioners of Justiciary, with
appeal to the Appeal Court of the High Court of Justiciary, presided over by the senior
Scottish judge, the Lord Justice General. The procedure and the rules of evidence used in
these proceedings were those of Scotland.
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44
stated to have been adopted under the (U.K.) United Nations Act 1946, a
statute which regulates the effect to be given in the United Kingdom to
mandatory resolutions of the Security Council. Resolution 1192 (1998),
adopted on 27 August 1988 by the Security Council as a unanimous
response to the United States/United Kingdom call for a trial in a neutral
venue,45 acting under its mandatory powers under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, demanded that "all States . . . cooperate" with the joint United
States/United Kingdom trial "initiative," as the resolution described it. The
Order in Council is therefore to be seen as an implementation, through the
United Nations Act 1946, of Security Council Resolution 1192 (1998); and
the trial as authorized by, though not necessarily proceeding under, the
mandate of the Security Council.
The reason for using the Security Council resolution as authority for
the trial, rather than the inherent jurisdiction of the Scottish courts in such
cases, was, one assumes, to keep the pressure on Libya to surrender the two
accused. In August 1998, partially because of the fact that the sanctions
regime against Libya was being increasingly flouted, 4 it was by no means
certain that the accused, Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi and Al Amin
Khalifa Fhimah, would be surrendered for trial. It was clearly expedient to
utilize a binding resolution of the Security Council as the basis for the trial,
given that the same resolution obligated all States, including, of course,
Libya make available
Libya, to cooperate; and specifically demanded ' that
47
,
Libya.
in
witnesses
or
evidence
"any
to the court
The trial proceeded as a normal trial on indictment in the High Court
in Scotland. In terms of the Order in Council, except as provided for in the
Order, the Lockerbie trial was to "be conducted in accordance with the law
relating toj8roceedings on indictment before the High Court of Justiciary in
This was, then, a domestic assertion of jurisdiction over
Scotland.' "
terrorist crimes. Neither the genesis of the trial in a Security Council
49
resolution, nor the attendance at the trial of United Nations observers, nor

44 The High Court of the Justiciary (Proceedings in the Netherlands) Order 1998, S.I. No.
1998/225 1, U.N. Doc. S/1998/795 (1998), Preamble [hereinafter "Order 1998"].
45 Letter Dated 24 August 1998 from the Acting Permanent Representatives of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary General, UN Doc. S/1998/795.
46 Anthony Aust, Lockerbie: The Other Case, 49 INT'L & .CoMP. L. Q. 278, 283 (2000).
41 S.C. Res. 1192, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3920th mtg.
4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/i192

(1998).
48 Order 1998, supra note 44, art. 3(2).
49 S.C. Res. 1192 (1998), supra note 47,

the trial).

6 (authorizing international observers to attend
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the location of the trial in the Netherlands,5 ° converts the Lockerbie trial
into some kind of international proceeding.
It is equally clear that the Lockerbie trial was not a criminal
proceeding under the Montreal Convention. That convention, like the other
terrorism conventions, provides for prosecution only in a State in which the
offenders are found or a State to which they may be extradited. 5' Megrahi
and Fhimah were, from the date of their indictment until their appearance in
the Netherlands on 5 April 1999, located in Libya. Libya asserted its right,
under art. 7 of the Montreal Convention to prosecute them. 52 This claim
was rejected by the governments of the United Kingdom and United States,
which demanded prosecution in either Scotland or the United States. At all
times, the demand of the United Kingdom and United States was for the
surrenderof the two accused. The demand was not for their extradition,
which could not have stood in law: no State, under the Montreal
Convention or otherwise, can be required to extradite its nationals. From
the outset of the Security Council's involvement in early 1992,
notwithstanding its customary use of circular and opaque language, the
Council demanded the surrender of the two Libyan accused, not their
extradition. 4 The United States/United Kingdom "initiative" in August
1998, the Security Council's resolutions and Libya's eventual response all
prove that the transfer of Megrahi and Fhimah from Libya to the
Netherlands was not an extradition. Ironically, on the arrival of the two
Libyans on Dutch territory, the only way under Dutch law to transfer them
to the jurisdiction of the Scottish Court at Camp Zeist was by extradition
(from one part of the Netherlands to another). 55
It is significant that none of the terrorism conventions, not even the
new Comprehensive Terrorism Convention, makes provision for trial other
50 See id. 4, as fleshed out in Agreement Between the Government of the Kingdom of
the Netherlands and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland Concerning a Scottish Trial in the Netherlands, Sept. 18, 1998, Neth.-U.K., N. Ir., 38
I.L.M. 926 and Order 1998, supra note 44.
51Montreal Convention, supra note 2, art. 7.
52
See JoHN P. GRANT, THE LOCKERBIE TRIAL: A DOCUMENTARY HiSTORY 106 (2004).

53 See, e.g., Joyner & Rothbaum, supra note 19, at 241; Omer Y. Elagab, The Hague as
the Seat of the Lockerbie Trial: Some Constraints,34 INT'L LAW 289, 306 (2000).
" S.C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3033d mtg. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (1992)
(requesting that Libya "provide a full and effective response" to the United States/United
Kingdom demands, these demands being contained in communications to the Council (UN
Doc. A/46//825-S/23306 and UN Doc. A/46/828-S/23309)); S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR,
47th Sess., 3063d mtg. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992)(transforming that request into an
obligation by requiring Libya to comply with the operative part of Resolution 731); S.C.
Res. 883, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3312th mtg. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/883 (1993), (repeating
that Libya must comply with resolutions 731 and 748).
55Aust, supra note 46, at 287.
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than in the State in which the alleged offenders are located or a State to
which they may be extradited. Nowhere is there reference to the type of
arrangement made for the Lockerbie trial. More surprisingly, particularly
in light of the current vogue for international tribunals, nowhere is there
reference to the possibility of terrorist crimes, not even those of the political
leaders of States that sponsor terrorism or provide safe havens or succor for
terrorists, coming before some international tribunal.
111. InternationalJustice
The vogue for international tribunals began in 1945 with the
establishment of international military tribunals to try major German and
Japanese military and political leaders for crimes arising out of the Second
World War. Tribunals were set up at Nuremberg 56 and Tokyo 57 on very
similar lines, each with jurisdiction in respect of crimes against peace, war
crimes and crimes against humanity. The novelty of these tribunals was
their recognition that individuals could be subject to prosecution for crimes
under international law,5 8 that the political status of the individuals was
irrelevant 59 and that superior orders were not a defense. 60 For the first time,
24 individuals at Nuremberg and 28 individuals at Tokyo were tried by an
international tribunal for crimes under international law. These were,
admittedly, exceptional times and exceptional crimes, but an important
principle had been established. In 1946, the UN General Assembly
expressly affirmed "the principles of international law" of the Nuremberg
Charter and the judgment of the tribunal.6 '
Since that time, various attempts have been made to establish an
international criminal court on a permanent basis. Early optimism is
apparent from the Genocide Convention of 1948 that, in addition to
providing for jurisdiction over offenders in domestic courts, also provided
for jurisdiction in an "international penal tribunal., 62 However, the
56The Charter is an annex to the London Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment
of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S.
279.
57The Charter is embodied in a Special Proclamation of the Supreme Allied Commander,
T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20 (1970).
58See The Charter of the Nuremberg International Military Ttribunal, supra note 56, art.
6.
'9See id. art. 7.
60See id. art. 8.
61 G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. GOAR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/1/95 (1948).
principles were later articulated by the 2 UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION, YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 374-78 (1950).

These
LAW

62 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
art. 6, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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difficulties in getting agreement had been underestimated and it was not
63
until 1998 that the Statute of the International Criminal Court was agreed;
that Statute came into force in July 2002. In the interim, special ad hoc
criminal tribunals were created by the Security Council for international
crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia 64 and Rwanda. 65 But these, like
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, reflected egregious crimes committed
in exceptional circumstances. They are not permanent and both may be
consigned to history by the end of this decade. Their substantive
jurisdiction reflects the events that occurred in two geographical areas. But
perhaps most critically, they run the risk of being accused of bias and
partiality: why should individuals in two parts of the world be subject to
international justice when individuals committing identical acts in other
parts are not?
The ad hocery inherent in all the earlier tribunals has now been
replaced by a permanent international criminal court, with jurisdiction over
genocide (at last), crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of
aggression. 66 As at Nuremberg, individuals are criminally responsible for
international crimes,67 the status of individuals is irrelevant to their criminal
69
responsibility 68 and superior orders are no defense.
There are, of course, attractions in having an international tribunal or
the ICC as the primary, or at least the secondary, forum for the prosecution
of terrorist offences. International tribunals, it is said, are free from the
taint of prejudice.7 ° Prior to 1998, Libya frequently refused to surrender the
63

Rome

Statute

of the International

Criminal

Court, July

17,

1998,

U.N.

Doc.A/CONF. 183/9; 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Statute of the ICC].
64 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993)
as amended by S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3878th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 166
(1998) and S.C. Res. 1329, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4240th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/1329
(2000). See also www.un.org/icty.
65 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and
Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
Neighbouring States, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994). See also www.ictr.org.
66 Statute of the ICC, supra note 63, art. 5.
67 Id. art. 25.
68

Id. art. 27.

69

1d. art. 33.

70 STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAHAMS, AccOuNTABILrrY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

ATROcITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 184 (2nd ed. 2001); Bryan F. MacPherson, Building an
InternationalCriminalCourtfor the 21st Century, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 27 (1998).

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 36:453

two Lockerbie suspects to Scotland or the United States on the ground that
they could not possibly receive a fair trial as a result of the extensive
7
publicity identifying the pair as the Lockerbie bombers. ' It was only
through the Security Council-endorsed proposal for trial in a neutral venue,
coupled with whatever was contained in the secret agreement/understanding
reached between the United Kingdom and Libya 72 that secured the
appearance in the Netherlands of Megrahi and Fhimah on 5 April 1999: all
intended and designed to be assurances of a fair trial.
While the absence of prejudice in an international tribunal may be
somewhat overstated, it is undoubtedly true that a State may be much more
willing to extradite or surrender individuals accused of terrorism who are
within its territory, particularly its own nationals, to an international
tribunal than a foreign domestic court. Alleged terrorists may have more
confidence in a fair trial before international judges than the juries and/or
73
judges of the State that has suffered the terrorist offences. Reference to an
international tribunal also allows the "heat" to be taken out of terrorist
trials, allowing the States concerned-the State which has suffered the
terrorism and the State with custody of the alleged terrorists-to continue
relations in a more normal manner than trial in a domestic court.
International justice, rather than domestic justice, is said to realize
better the expectations of the victims of international crimes and their
families.74 In relation to the Pan Am 103 bombing, it is plump and plain
that the victims' families demanded nothing other than domestic justiceand, for the majority of them, American justice at that. Furthermore, it is
argued that international tribunals give the impression that the international
community is taking international crimes seriously, 75 these crimes being of
6
a nature that should not be left to the whims of domestic prosecution.
This may apply to international crimes of a particularly widespread,
systematic and heinous nature - genocide or crimes against humanity - but
is a singularly peculiar idea if applied to terrorist crimes. By not seeking to
establish some international tribunal for Megrahi and Fhimah, were the
United Kingdom and United States indicating that they did not take the
sabotage of Pan Am 103 seriously? Even more bizarrely, is the United
71 See the Statement of the Lockerbie Suspects Defence Group of 25 December 1997
(annexed to UN Doc. S/1997/1015) and the Position Paper of the Libyan Permanent Mission
to the UN of December 1997. GRANT, supra note 52, at 135.
72 See GRANT, supra note 52, at 170.
73 Elagab, supranote 53, at 304.
74 Justice Richard Goldstone, The United Nations' War Crimes Tribunals: An Assessment,
12 CONN. J. INT'L L. 227, 238 (1997).
75 Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trend Towards Criminal Prosecution and
Punishmentof Breaches ofInternationalHumanitarianLaw, 9 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 2 (1998).
76 Antonio Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L.REv. 1, 6
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States insistence on domestic prosecution an indication that it does not take
the events of 9/11 seriously? The reality is that States invariably wish to
manage issues for themselves and will only seek international involvement
77
when there is no option or the issues involve no vital national interest.
Of course, the fundamental and enduring problem with utilizing the
ICC to deal with international terrorist offences is that these offences are
excluded from the substantive jurisdiction of the Court. This is not an
accident, but it is as strange as it is absurd. International terrorism is the
issue in international criminal law-and has been since 9/11, if not
before-and excluding international terrorists, and particularly those who
sponsor terrorism or provide safe havens or succor to terrorists, from the
ICC's jurisdiction flies in the face of contemporary realities
Terrorism, as a "treaty crime," was excluded from the jurisdiction of
the ICC, largely because it was already proscribed under existing
conventional arrangements. 8 Attempts at the 1998 Rome conference to
revive terrorism as a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC failed for lack
of agreement; it was not considered to be as serious as the crimes within the
ICC's jurisdiction. 79 From the outset of the deliberations to establish the
Court, there was clear consensus that the Court would deal with only the
most serious offences: "unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the
conscience of humanity" being "grave crimes [that] threaten the peace,
security and well-being of the world." 80 These are expressed as genocide
crimes against humanity and war crimes.8 1 These crimes are then defined82
and have subsequently been the subject of further elaboration. 3 Terrorism,
in the manifestations we have witnessed in the last 50 years, is not genocide
as that term is generally understood; and it is difficult to see it being a war
crime, a category of international offences that has a long history and clear
parameters.
But could acts of terrorism constitute a crime against humanity?
Certainly, the events of 21 December 1988-and a fortiori the events of 11
77 Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273,285-86 (1997).
78 Compare Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
InternationalCriminal Court, addendum pt. 1, at 2, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1
(1998), with Statute of the ICC, supra note 63.
79See Neil Boister, The Exclusion of Treaty Crimesfrom the Jurisdictionof the Proposed
International Criminal Court: Law, Pragmatism, Politics, 3 J.ARMED CONFLICT L. 27

(1998).
80 Statute of the ICC, supra note 63, Preamble.
81 id.art.

5.

82 Id.arts. 6-8.

83 Report of the PreparatoryCommissionfor the InternationalCriminalCourt:
Finalized
Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, addendum pt. 2, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2

(2000).
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September 2001-would strike most people as crimes against humanity.
The definition of the term "crimes against humanity" contained in the ICC
84
Statute hardly supports this contention as a matter of law. The closest the
ICC's substantive jurisdiction comes to the facts of the Lockerbie bombing
is murder, but to qualify as a crime against humanity the murder must be
committed "as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
any civilian population . . .,5 However egregious the events of 21
December 1988 were-and they were egregious-they arguably do not
qualify under the demanding test prescribed by the ICC Statute. That does
not mean that they should not qualify, simply that they do not qualify as the
Statute is presently framed. Again, it is worth bearing in mind that the
drafters of the Rome Statute did not intend to include international
terrorism within the ICC's substantive jurisdiction. International terrorism
is, after all, subject to an extensive and detailed regime of its own.
In addition, the jurisdiction of the ICC is complementary to that of
domestic courts.86 Any State party to the ICC Statute has primary
jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the ICC only kicks in if it is "unwilling
87 The
or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.,
drafters of the Statute were not naive and recognized that this State
preference would not apply when the State was shielding the alleged
offender 88 or when the proceedings are not being conducted independently
or impartially. 89 Assuming that all the parties to the Lockerbie case were
parties to the ICC Statute-a huge assumption given that the United States
(with a vengeance) and Libya are not parties to the Statute-would Libya
have lost its jurisdictional preference because it was shielding Megrahi and
Fhimah? Would the United Kingdom and United States forfeit their claims
to jurisdiction because neither could guarantee a fair trial?
There are other, more technical, problems relating to prosecutions
before the ICC.90 The overall result must be that, however desirable it may
84 See Phyllis Hwang, Defining Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the
InternationalCriminal Court, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 457 (1998).
85 Statute of the ICC, supra note 63, art. 7(1); Report of the PreparatoryCommissionfor
the InternationalCriminal Court: FinalizedDraft Text of the Elements of Crimes, supra note
83, art. 7, Introduction, paras. 2, 3.
86 Statute of the ICC, supra note 63, Preamble, arts. 1, 17.
87

Id. art. 17(1).
88 Id. art. 17(2)(a).
89 Id. art. 17(2)(c).

90 See, e.g., Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, The InternationalCriminal Court: Jurisdictional
and Related Issues, 10 CRIM. L.F. 87 (1999); Ruth B. Philips, The International Criminal
Court Statute: Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 10 CRlM. L.F. 61 (1999); Christopher L.
Blakesley, Jurisdiction,Definition of Crimes, and TriggeringMechanisms, 25 DENV. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 233 (1997); John P. Grant & Rupert E. Dickinson, The Lockerbie Stalemate: Is
an InternationalCriminal Court the Answer?, 1996 JURID. REv. 250.
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appear to have terrorist offences prosecuted before some international
tribunal, there is no tribunal with a clear mandate to undertake such a task.
That being the case, the prosecution of alleged terrorists in the future will,
in conformity with the manifest intention and clear wording of the twelve
conventions in the international terrorism rdgime (not counting the draft
Comprehensive Terrorism and Nuclear Terrorism Conventions) remain
with States. Essentially, in terms of the regime, that means that any
prosecution will take place in either the State in whose territory (or against
whose interests) the terrorist acts have been committed or the State with
custody of the alleged offenders-in short, the States with the most direct
interest in actually prosecuting the alleged offenders, and which also have
the bulk of the physical evidence and the majority of the witnesses.
IV Enter the Security Council
The Lockerbie bombing is noteworthy in the annals of United Nations
history as the first time that the Security Council has used its not
inconsiderable powers to order a member State to surrender two of its
nationals for trial in the territory of another member State. While
Lockerbie may have been the first such exercise of power, it has not been
the only such exercise of power. In October 1999, the Security Council
imposed sanctions on Afghanistan, in part for its failure to surrender Osama
bin Laden for trial on terrorism charges. 9' It is tragically ironic that the
failure of the Taliban to honor, and of the Security Council and its members
to enforce, this demand allowed bin Laden, the accepted prime instigator, to
orchestrate the events of 11 September 2001.
While the sequence of Security Council activity in relation to the
Lockerbie bombing is easily and widely understood, the import of the
various resolutions is much less so. First, at the behest of the United States,
United Kingdom and French governments, the Security Council adopted a
resolution on 21 January 1992 urging, not demanding, that Libya respond to
the requests of the three governments.92 Two months later, on 31 March
1992, the Security Council adopted a further resolution, this time
demanding a Libyan response and authorizing the imposition of a range of

" S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4051st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999).

While the Preamble cites as concerns the Taliban treatment of women and girls and the
production of opium, it is in respect of the surrender of bin Laden that sanctions were
imposed (para. 4). The Security Council subsequently returned to bin Laden's surrender in
S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4053d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1269 (1999); S.C.
Res. 1333, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4251th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (2000); and, after
the 9/11 attacks, S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1368 (2001).
92

S.C. Res. 731, supra note 54.
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93
sanctions in the event that Libya did not comply within two weeks. On 11
November 1993, the Security Council adopted a further resolution repeating
the demands and extending the range of sanctions. 94 A full five years later,
on 27 August 1998, the Security Council, responding to the United
95
Kingdom/United States initiative for a trial in a neutral venue, adopted a
resolution endorsing and mandating that initiative and providing that
sanctions would be "suspended immediately" on the surrender for trial of
the two Libyan suspects.
So, the resolutions are predicated on certain demands made by the
governments of the United States, United Kingdom and France.
Unfortunately, these demands are not incorporated in terms into the
resolutions; they are merely incorporated by reference. The demands, to
which Libya is exhorted to respond in Resolution 731 (1998), became
mandatory as of 31 March 1992, because Resolution 748 (1992), adopted
97
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, was a legally binding instrument.
Briefly stated, the demands were for the surrender of Megrahi and Fhimah
for trial, the admission by Libya of responsibility for the Pan Am 103
atrocity, the payment of acceptable compensation and the renunciation of
terrorism. The sanctions imposed in respect of all the demands were,
according to Resolution 1192 (1998), to be suspended on the satisfaction of
one of them, viz. the surrender for trial in the Netherlands of the Megrahi
and Fhimah.
Just as Security Council Resolution 748 (1992) was the first occasion
on which the Council had used its powers under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter to compel a member State to surrender two of its nationals indicted
on terrorism charges for trial abroad, so Resolution 1373 (2001) of 28
September 2001 marked another new departure for the Security Council in
combating terrorism. Adopted in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11
atrocities and based on the Financing of Terrorism Convention of 1999,98
99
the resolution sought to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts
by requiring States to "criminalize the willful provision or collection, by
any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their

93S.C. Res. 748, supra note 54.
94See S.C. Res. 883, supra note 54.

95See S.C. Res. 1192, supranote 47.
96 Id.
97 Decisions of the Security Council adopted under Chapter VII, which deals with "threats
to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression" are binding on all members by
virtue of Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations. U.N. CHARTER. ch. VII & art. 25.
98 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra note
14.
99S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg.
(2001).

l(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373
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territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the
knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts."' 00
While the Financing of Terrorism Convention has 106 parties,
Resolution 1373 (2001), adopted under Chapter VII, is binding on all 191
members of the United Nations. While the Financing of Terrorism
Convention incorporates the aut dedere aut judicare principle,' 0 ' Resolution
1373 (2001) contains no reference to extradition, placing responsibility for
implementing the resolution and enforcing that implementation exclusively
in each and every State.' 0 2 While the Financing of Terrorism Convention
provides for jurisdiction in a number of States, r°3 Resolution 1373 (2001)
mandates jurisdiction exclusively in each and every UN member.'°4 While
the Financing of Terrorism Convention contains no international
monitoring body, Resolution 1373 (2001) provides for the establishment of
a Counter Terrorism Committee, consisting of all Security Council
members, to "monitor implementation" of the resolution. 0 5
Does this mark a new approach to dealing with terrorist crimes, an
approach that seeks to overcome the limitations of conventional
arrangements with options as to the State of prosecution and an overall
monitoring body? Core terrorism conventions-for example, the Terrorist
Bombings Convention of 1997,1°6 and the Comprehensive Terrorism
Convention ° 7 and Nuclear Terrorism Convention' 08 when adopted--could
be converted into universal obligations by resolution of the Security
Council. Indeed, the Nuclear Weapons Convention may have been preuniversalized, at least in part, by Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)
of 24 April 2004 which demands cooperation among States preventing the
proliferation, through prosecution if necessary, of nuclear (and chemical

1oo Id. 1(b); see also id.
l(c) (freezing funds and assets); id.
l(d) (prohibiting
donations).
101See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra
note 14, art. 10.
102 See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 99, 1.
103 See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
supra

note 14, art. 7.
104 See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 99,
1.
Id.

6; see also Eric Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373, the CounterTerrorism Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism, 97 AM. J. INT'L. L. 333 (2003);
Counter-Terrorism Committee Website at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373.
106 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supranote 13.
107 Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, supra note 21.
108 Draft International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,
supra note 22.
105
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and biological) weapons and their means of delivery. 10 9 A further Security
Council Resolution, Resolution 1566 (2004), adopted on 8 October 2004,
''calls upon all States to prevent [a range of acts already included in the
Terrorist Bombings Convention and others] and, if not prevented, to ensure
that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with their grave
nature.""l0 The term "Calls upon" is hardly the language of obligation, but
it is not that far short, particularly in a resolution expressly adopted under
Chapter VII of the Charter. One suspects that this trend will continue,
perhaps not systematically (that is hardly the way of political bodies), but
rather in response to particular real or perceived threats.
The response to 9/11 went beyond any invocation of the relevant
terrorism convention-indeed, it has to be doubted that any of the sectoral
conventions applied. Such was the strength of feeling, both in the United
States and in the international community, that the Security Council, in
adopting Resolution 1368 (2001) on 12 September 2001, expressly
"recogniz[ed] the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in
The use of force in contemporary
accordance with the Charter.""'
international law being prima facie unlawful under art. 2(4) of the UN
Charter, the justification for the use of force by the United States/United
Kingdom coalition in Afghanistan to root out terrorist suspects and destroy
terrorist bases and training camps can only be found in the concept of selfdefense. Self-defense requires, in terms of art. 51 of the Charter, an "armed
attack," meaning an armed attack by another State. The legality of the
Afghan operation therefore depends on linking the acts of a non-State
terrorist group, Al Qaeda, with the Taliban, the governmental authority in
Afghanistan. Taliban complicity in Al Qaeda and its activities, it can be
asserted, implicated the Afghan State, thereby making the 9/11 atrocities
arguably an armed attack, therefore permitting a proportionate response.
This is not the place to debate the legality of the Afghan operation,
though it is the place to emphasize that the operation was a response to
terrorism. Does this mark yet another new approach to dealing with
terrorist crimes? In the future, are we to expect that a State, subject to some
egregious terrorist act, will invoke the right of self-defense to enter another
Or were the
State forcibly in order to capture terrorist suspects?
and the
Taliban
the
of
misrule
chaotic
time-the
the
at
circumstances
recur?
to
unlikely
and
Qaeda-unique
Al
with
links
manifest
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1"9 See S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4956th mtg.
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(2004); cf. Draft International Convention for the Suppression of acts of Nuclear Terrorism,
supra note 22, art. 2, 7, 9-11.
3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566
"0 S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5053d mtg.
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V. Conclusions
Whether the Security Council adopts resolutions to universalize
terrorist crimes and whether States seek to replicate the Afghan operation,
one thing is clear. At the international level, terrorist crime is no longer the
exclusive province of the twelve terrorism conventions. Beginning on 31
March 1992 with Resolution 748 (1992), the Security Council has assumed
an active role in combating terrorism, a role that is unlikely to diminish and
likely to expand. That being the case, we are perhaps moving to a multifaceted approach to terrorism, where some terrorist crimes falls within the
terrorism conventions, while other terrorist crimes are subject to Security
Council2 involvement in imposing sanctions and, even, authorizing military
force."1
In the Lockerbie trial, Scotland "was given the opportunity to
demonstrate to an on-looking world that Scottish criminal justice is indeed
independent, dignified and scrupulously fair to the accused.""' 3 While all
might not agree with that assessment, 1 4 the trial at least demonstrated that
domestic criminal justice systems are perfectly able to investigate,
prosecute (and successfully at that) and adjudicate complicated and
egregious acts of terrorism.
While the Lockerbie trial was not strictly an application of the
Montreal Convention, the underlying and core philosophy of the convention
and the other terrorism conventions mandating domestic prosecution and
adjudication of terrorist crimes was vindicated by the flexibility agreed by
the parties, and endorsed by the Security Council, of trial in a neutral venue
with a panel of judges replacing a jury." 5 The flexibility demonstrated in
the arrangements for the Lockerbie trial can provide a model for future
terrorism prosecutions where the aut dedere aut judicare principle cannot,
for whatever reason, be utilized, thus allowing the surrender for trial of
terrorist suspects through agreement with the custodial State or with the
involvement, either coercive or benign, of the Security Council.
The international terrorism regime, including the Montreal Convention
and the draft Comprehensive Terrorism Convention, fail to address directly
the issues of State-sponsored terrorism and the harboring of terrorists and
colluding in terrorist crimes by States. While almost forgivable at the time
See Frank A. Biggio, Neutralizing the Threat: Reconsidering Existing Doctrines in the
Emerging War on Terrorism, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002).
13 Donna E. Arzt, The Lockerbie "Extraditionby Analogy" Agreement: "Exceptional
Measure" or Template for TransnationalCriminal Justice, 18 AM. U. INT'L L.REv. 163 at
226 (2002).
114See Grant, supra note 52 at 280, 434 (recounting the reports of Dr. Hans Kochler, one
of the U.N. observers at the trial and appeal).
115See Arzt, supra note 113 (the definitive account of the arrangements agreed for the
surrender of Megrahi and Fhimah for trial).
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of the adoption of the Montreal Convention in 1971, experience since that
time, not least the whole Lockerbie experience, makes it difficult to justify
how any terrorism convention now can fail to even mention these issues. In
the conventional world of the suppression of terrorism, it is as if 9/11 never
happened. Almost as a consequence, a role has opened for the United
Nations to mandate terrorism suppression measures, as the Security Council
did in Resolution 1373 (2001), in Resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1566 (2004)
and, of course, to induce the surrender of terrorists for trial, as the Security
Council did in Resolutions 731 (1992), 748 (1992) and 883 (1993).
These developments, coupled with the use of force in 2002 to root out
terrorist bases in Afghanistan and capture terrorist suspects, point to the
emergence of a multi-faceted approach to terrorism, whereby the terrorism
regime is utilized for "regular" terrorist crimes, with direct and forcible
action utilized against terrorists and the countries in which they are located
for particularly egregious terrorist acts. Under that scenario, the destruction
of Pan Am 103 would fall at a level where Security Council support is
required to secure compliance with the spirit of the Montreal Convention,
while 9/11 falls beyond the purview of the terrorism rdgime and requires
the use of force. If that is the pattern for the future, and not merely
particular reactions to particular circumstances, then two questions arise.
What is the level of egregiousness that moves matters beyond the terrorism
rdgime? And, who decides?
There is a case for extending the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court to include the political leaders of States that sponsor or
collude in terrorist crimes, not least because the complementarity principle
recognized in the ICC Statute maintains the essential integrity of the
terrorism conventions by allowing primacy of domestic prosecution, yet
providing back-stop international prosecution where domestic prosecution
cannot or does not operate. Also, the ICC already has jurisdiction over a
range on international crimes, some of which, on any scale of judgment, are
less serious and less threatening to security in the contemporary world.
The clarion call-and the ultimate lesson of the Lockerbie trial-is
that, in the war on terrorism, the international community needs to adopt a
multi-faceted approach to what is, after all, a multi-faceted problem. For
the future, particularly egregious terrorist acts need to be thought of as
subject not only to the Montreal Convention, but also amenable to the other
rights and remedies available to States under international law, provided
for, yet regulated by, the UN Charter.

